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Martin: Security and the Administration of Manuscript Holdings at Souther

SECURITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF MANUSCRIPT
HOLDINGS AT SOUTHERN ACADEMIC LIBRARIES

Katherine F. Martin

Part II:
Security Procedures and the Patron*

Protecting the manuscript collection against misuse by those whom its organization and administration
are designed to serve demands the abandonment 0£ reliance on public trustworthiness and the adoption 0£ a
body 0£ coordinated security procedures. Foremost
among these must be the habit 0£ surveillance.
It is
this observation 0£ the patron, and the accompanying
regulation 0£ his access to and handling 0£ manuscript
materials, that receives the most attention when discussion in the literature turns to the defense of a
repository's holdings. The chief difficulty in applying any 0£ the recommendations which relate to reader
service lies, of course, in the concurr~nt striving to
achieve that balanced state 0£ a££airs that provides
£or security without imposing undue or unwarranted restrictions on the patron.
Observation 0£ patron behavior in the reading room
is perhaps the central element in insuring the security
of manuscripts in use.
This practice can be carried
out, although with varying degrees 0£ effectiveness, in
several different ways. Uniformly recommended is the
*Part I 0£ Ms. Martin's study 0£ security practices at southern academic libraries, "Administration,
Staffing, and Physical Security," appeared in the
spring 1980 issue 0£ Georgia Archive.
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continuous posting o-f a trained staff member in th~
search room . As English archivist Hilary Jenkinson has
noted, supervision should always include the pre sence
of an official whenever manuscripts are in use , if only
as a technical guarantee.l It is the presence of such
a staff member, or alternatively of a guard , which contributes the most to the impression of a concern for
security and the intention to successfully maintain
it. 2 Yet of the eighty-six repositories surveyed only
six (6.9%) regularly station a staff member charged
solely with the observation of patrons in the reading
room; another three (3.4%) alternate between this
policy and delegation of certain responsibilities to
this individual which require him to divide his attention or leave his post.
The most popular method of surveillance among
those surveyed was stationing an attendant in the
search room while assigning other distracting duties to
him . As thirty-one of the respondents were dependent
on one full-time professional assisted by at most one
nonprofessional for care of their manuscript holdings,
it is not surprising that these and sixteen other repositories, some having only part-time staff, found it
necessary to demand such a division of tasks .
In
thirty-two cases (37 . 2%) this practice went uncomplemented by any other means of surveillance. Twenty-six
libraries (30 . 2%) depended on indirect observation of
patrons by staff in an adjacent area; ten (11 . 6%) combined this with another form of surveillance, while
sixteen (18.6%) did not.
Four special collections also
utilized some form of video monitoring . Of the remaining eighteen repositories (two not providing information on this topic), fourteen (16 . 2%) employed no surveillance procedures.
In judging this apparent weakness in security practices, however, one might bear in
mind not only the possibility of financial constraints
but also the idea advanced by Alfredda Scobey, an
attorney who has made a special study of the theft of
archival and library materials, that "what is required
in the way of surveillance depends less on the class of
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people using the facilities than on the value of the
holdings."3
Of the fifty-four respondents relying on attendants in the reading area to provide surveillance of
manuscripts in use, forty-two (77.7%) maintain a staff
member on duty at all times, and another four (7.4%)
report that they usually do so. Thus, those who depend
on staff in the search room to provide security are
regular in their use of this method. The effect of
this faithfulness is, however, reduced in some cases by
the physical arrangement of the reading room. Of the
seventy collections relying on staff monitoring in some
form, eleven (15.7%) are handicapped by a -physical layout which prevents simultaneous observation of all
patrons. This must be recognized as a particularly
serious situation for these repositories, and others
with the same problem, because of the generally static
quality of facilities and the expense, inconvenience,
and bureaucratic entanglement involved in instituting
any satisfactory changes in existing quarters.

The effectiveness of surveillance can be increased
in one way by the exercise of some control over those
permitted access to the collection. A registration
procedure which includes provision of personal identification and references and an interview with a staff
member has become a common precaution. The idea of
screening that such a practice evokes has, however, met
with disfavor in some circles, particularly as it suggests preferential treatment for those affiliated with
the host institution. or guaranteed special privileges
under terms of an agreement with a donor.4 Manuscripts
curator Robert L. Brubaker found in his 1964 survey of
seventy-seven major manuscript collections that many
libraries continue to prefer that their manuscripts be
used only for serious research purposes, and hence are
often reluctant to grant access to genealogists and
undergraduates.5
As long as equal access prevails, however, it has
continued to be acceptable to examine applicants'
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motives and abilities and to exclude those who have
"demonstrated such carelessness or deliberate destructiveness as to endanger the safety of the material. 11 6
Indeed, as archivist Theodore R. Schellenberg has observed, it is the duty of the repository to make "materials available only to the fullest extent consistent
with a reasonable regard for their preservation, weighing the demands of present-day inquirers for their use
against the demands of posterity for their preservatio n.11 7
Among the libraries surveyed, the interview is the
most commonly employed screening device. As librarian
Robert Ro senthal has noted, however, the procedure is
of benefit to the patron as well as to the securityconsc ious sta ff.
The interview not only constitutes
the simplest way f o r a prospective user to present his
credentials and explain his intentions, and in turn be
informed of the regulations of the repository, but also
can be used to make the reader aware of guides, services, and even manuscript materials unknown to him,
and of others who are investigating the same or related
topics. 8 Interviews are required at least some of the
time by sixty-four {74.4%) of the institutions surveyed; twenty-five of the fifty-four (46.2%) employing
nonprofessionals permit these staff members to conduct
examination and orientation sessions .
Forty-seven {54.6%) repositories demand some form
of formal identific ation of those applying to use manuscript materials; in most cases, an item bearing a
photograph of the bearer, such as a driver's license or
student identification, is specified . While over half
the repositories surveyed require interviews and presentation of materials of identification, only fourteen
(16.2%) demand references of researchers. Of these,
eleven use this requirement as more than a means of
suggesting security consciousness; at these libraries
patrons' references are frequently checked , particularly when application is made to use certain collections.
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The determination that an individual 1 s 11 prepar_a tion and purpose 11 9 are acceptable is, 0£ course , only a
part of insuring satisfactory behavior in the search
room. Surveillance plays a large role in attaining
this end. Perhaps equally important is the d ist ribution of rules and regulations detailing restrictions
and orienting patrons to the use 0£ manuscript materials; in many instances, a prospective reader is required to sign a statement attesting to his examination
and acceptance 0£ such conditions . Further reinforcement in the form 0£ posted signs summarizing such regulations and detailing the penalties £or theft or mutilation 0£ materials is also recommended.lo
The value 0£ such patron instruction is widely
recognized by tho se in the survey group; fifty-one
(59.3%) distribute to their researchers a list 0£ rules
a nd regulations governing use 0£ their manuscript holdings. 0£ these, thirty-eight (44.1%) also require a
signed agreement to the same.
It is the prevailing and
widely advocated practice that such use contracts also
include substantial personal information about the
applicant, including his name, local and permanent
addresses, educational background, institutional
a££iliation, research interests, purpose, and publication plans.11 Some institutions also require prospective readers to specify whether they intend only to
examine materials, copy text or take notes, publish
utilizing information so obtained, or publish the text
of materials examined.
The most commonly suggested restrictions on use
include checking of personal belongings with signifi cant limitation 0£ what may be carried into the search
room and banning smoking, food, and ink. Thirty- two
(37.2%) of those participating in this study indicated
that they regularly store patrons' possessions outside
of the reading room; another two libraries make such
decisions on a case-by-case basis. Seventeen of the
thirty-two repositories (53 . 1%) which limit what
patrons may take into the search room permit only writing materials; thirteen specify that only paper and
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p e ncil may be carr ied in, wh ile three allow only 11 wr~t 
ing items . " Four other libraries also permit researchers to retain their notes or mechanical aids.
Sixty- four of the responding repositories (74.4%)
p r ohibit all smoking in their qua r ters; almost all of
those which do permit the practice do not a l low concurrent use of manuscripts. No respondee indicated that
food is allowed in the collection . Thirty- seven re positories (43 . 0%) permit researchers to use ink, while
one library reported that its policy on this matter
varies . Typewriters are permitted by fifty libraries
(58 . 1%); of the thirty which reported their prohibition, some noted the lack of suitable quarters for
their use . Many collections also impose one additional
regulation . Twenty- six (30.2%) of those surveyed indicated that patrons are assigned a place in the reading
room, a procedure permitting staff to seat those using
particularly rare or valuable materials, or those whose
motives are suspect, in a highly visible location.
The maintenance of use records also contributes to
materials in patrons ' hands. Twenty- nine
(33 . 7%) of those surveyed produce access logs in some
form . Fifty institutions (58 . 1%) require the patron to
complete signed and dated charge slips before providing
requested materials. These, if retained, constitute a
virtually irrefutable record of an individual's use of
materials at a given time, inval uable in determining
possible culpability in the case of missing manu scripts.
pro~ecting

One means of augmenting this procedure is the u se
of a daily register, where similar records are maintained under the name of the reader rather than the
manuscript group . The lesser effectiveness of this
generally more informal record is r e fl e cted in its less
frequent use by those participating in this study . Of
eighty-three repositories responding on this s ub ject ,
forty - two (50 . 6%) use a daily register .
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Sta££ supervision 0£ photoduplication, and. the
maintenance 0£ thorough records 0£ this service, is
another precaution which serves the same purpose as the
charge slip and the daily register.
Robert L. Brubaker1 s 1964 study 0£ major manuscript repositories in
this country found an increasing liberalism in photoduplication policies;l2 this trend is mirrored in the
practices 0£ those contacted in this study. Seventyseven (92.7%) 0£ the eighty-three institutions which
provided information on duplicating procedures permit
replication in some £orm. 0£ these seventy-seven, however, all but twelve (15.5%) allow researchers to do
their own copying; two others require sta££ to do the
- duplicating in some cases.
Less information is available on the number which
maintain records 0£ these services. 0£ the £i£ty-£our
respondents to this query, twenty-six (48.1%) report
keeping such statistics, either in the £orm 0£ a log or
through notations made on the patron's charge slips or
registration £orm. Another three libraries keep notes
on payments received or the number 0£ items duplicated.
Thus, only some 37 percent 0£ those providing duplicating services can be definitely identified as producing
records 0£ their use.
Regulation 0£ the number 0£ manuscripts provided
to the reader and 0£ his access to unprocessed materials has also proven helpful in controlling theft and
mutilation. Both those who have conducted studies 0£
archival security and those who have had first-hand
experience with manuscript theft recommend limiting the
amount 0£ manuscripts brought to a researcher at any
one time. One box or a single volume is the ideal
maximum suggested, although the role 0£ sta££ constraints in implementing this policy is recognized.13
Seventy-two 0£ the eighty-two institutions (87.8%) reporting their practice in this area impose some limitations, a number indicative 0£ the broad recognition 0£
the value 0£ this elementary and easily introduced procedure. Some 0£ the smallest and most lightly utilized
repositories are quite strict about this practice.
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On limiting access to unprocessed materials , however, those surveyed score somewhat lower marks . Of
the seventy- nine which described their policies, fortyseven {59.4% ) permit patrons use of these items .
In
most instances, where the bulk of the repository ' s collections has been processed, this is not a uniform
practice; that is, it varies not only with the condition and organizational structure of a given manuscript
group and with staff knowledge and availability to
assist a scholar in its use, but also with such factors
as the nature of the patron's need for access and the
extent of the contemplated examination .
Perhaps the most effective means of limiting theft
and damage is the inspection of materials when returned
to the staff by the reader and the scrutiny of the researcher 1 s belongings on his departure . Checking individual manuscripts in and out is, as the American Historical Association's Ad Hoc Committee noted in its
1951 report, both costly in time and a nuisance to the
reader.14 Yet even as a cursory or random procedure,
it can serve as a deterrent to the unscrupulous and the
disturbed, and it can certainly be uniformly applied to
particularly valuable items.
In spite of the costliness of the practice in dollars and staff labor, sixtysix libraries (76.7%) report that they examine manuscripts to some degree, though frequently only upon
their return. There is great variation in this practice, including an actual count of all items as returned, random checks of materials against inventory,
and tho r ough inspection of certain marked folders with
contents judged susceptible to theft .
While thr ee-fourths of those surveyed thus make
some attempt to control unauthorized removal of materia l s from the collection, only twenty- nine (33 . 7%) make
any inspection of a researcher's personal possessions
on depa r ture . Perhaps those who examine their manuscripts feel that patron inspection represents an unnecessary duplication of effort.
In many instances,
however, such apparent neglect probably stems both from
a reluctance to submit the innocent majority to such a
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procedure and from the demands the practice, when combined with manuscript checking as well as · other security procedures, makes on the staff.
Such security measures as surveillance, requiring
of signed agreements to collection regulations, restrictions on possessions in the search room, use of
charge sl.ips, and examination of materials following
use little profit the manuscripts repository if it permits special privileges to certain patrons. Such
opportunities are extended to some researchers by
thirty-nine (45.3%) of those surveyed; these include
unsupervised use of manuscripts in closed studies, admittance to storage areas, issue of an extraordinary
amount of manuscripts, after-hours acces s , and c hargeout rights. Of these privileges, those that involve
relaxation of surveillance during hours of operation
are most commonly extended.
Some twenty libraries provide closed studies,
seventeen allow some researchers bulk use of manuscripts, and fifteen permit c ertain patrons stac k access.
In addition, eleven allow after-hours entry and
seven make provision for the circulation of manuscript
materials. Three employ flexible systems, keying what
is permitted to the special needs of the privileged
patron. Multiple concessions are made by nineteen
(48.7%) of the thirty-nine which make such arrangements. The most common pairing is permitting unsupervised use of manuscripts in closed studies and stack
access.
Those surveyed are, however, somewhat more reluctant to permit the removal of manuscripts under their
administration to other areas of the building o r from
the premises altogether. Carrying manuscripts from
departmental jurisdiction is allowed by thirty-four
repositories (39.5%). Twenty-one (24.4%) permit certain individuals, notably staff, faculty and school
administrators, to take materials from the building.
This latter practice is a direct violation of the Association of College and Research Libraries' Committee on

69

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 1980

9

Georgia Archive, Vol. 8 [1980], No. 2, Art. 7

Manu scripts Col lect i ons recommendatioFl,. approved as
ACRL policy ±n January 1974.15 It is disturbing that
this number of repositories continue to entrust the
supervision of such valuable material s to staff memb ers
untrained in their administration and frequently over burdened with the demands of their own departments, and
alternately to the hands of those who will expose them
to the risk of damage, if unintentional, i n the outside
world.
This lack of security consciousness in one important realm is not, however, indicative of a general
absence of appreciation for the need for protective
measures. Wide variation in practice and in the
strength of the overall security program is evident
among the repositories surveyed. Many of these institutions continue to be plagued by problems which are
shared by others similarly concerned with the preservation of valuable materials.
In fact, all but the most
well-funded and staffed manuscript departments and special collections continue to suffer some weaknesses in
their security programs. Yet many of the repositories
participating in this study recognize these weaknesses
and, as far as financial and administrative constraints
permit, are implementing necessary improvements and
modifications of existing procedures .
The analysis, on the part of those surveyed, of
areas of continued weakness in their security proce dures reflects the needs revealed in their reports of
current practice. Only one of the eighty- six repositories participating in this project had at that time
made any use of the Society of American Archivists'
(SAA) security consultant service. Many others, however, by their expression of concern for their inadequacies, have demonstrated their awareness of the need
for improvement . Only nine appear to have been motivated by theft during the last five years, and only six
have employed the SAA ' s national registry of lost and
stolen materials. Yet there is widespread evidence of
an appreciation for the tenet that the first factor in
security is prevention. At the same time, the
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oommitment to- the service of scholarship remains
strong, and balance, rather than the sacrifice of one
end in the attainment of the other, is generally
sought.
Foremost among those areas described as being in
the greatest need of change was the number of staff
members. This emphasis echoed the findings of library
analyst Maurice F. Tauber, who has described organization and administration as one of the usual trouble
spots in a library.16 Thirteen repositories (15.1%)
suggested that their surveillance operations and the
maintenance of adequate descriptions of their holdings
have been severely handicapped by an insufficiency of
personnel.
In contrast, two others claimed the opposite problem, citing too many staff members as a security threat. Staff attitude, particularly as it affects
the quality of surveillance, was cited as a problem
area by another two repositories, while one reported
the need for improved training of departmental personnel.
Inadequate surveillance procedures, a problem area
closely connected to insufficient staff, are a cause
for concern at ten libraries. That these two should be
most frequently cited in this self-analysis of security
weaknesses is not surprising. Thirty-one (36%) of the
eighty-six departments function with only one full-time
professional staff member, assisted by at most one
full-time nonprofessional. And eighteen (20.9%) have
only one full-time staff member. With the range of
demands thus made on a limited number of personnel, the
quality of surveillance together with that of other
security procedures naturally suffers.
Other practices negatively affected by lack of '
staff are examination of manuscripts following their
use and inspection of patrons' personal possessions
prior to their departure.
Sixty-six (76.7%) institutions report some scrutiny of manuscripts following
use; for the most part, however, this is not the
thorough examination that its effectiveness as a
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s.e curi ty measure demands. Twenty-nine {-33. 7%) repositories inspect patrons' belongings fqr concealed materials . . Thirty-two (37.2%) require the storage of some
possessions outside the search room. Yet this is not
widely recognized as an area in need of improvement, as
only two (2.3%) repositories cite the development of
more satisfactory storage for patrons' belongings as a
security goal.
After problems related to staffing inadequacies,
the physical arrangement of facilities is most frequently regarded as a pressing security matter. Seven
(8.1%) respondents note that the separation of reading
rooms from staff workrooms or storage areas, or alternately the barriers to surveillance presented by the
collection layout, is a cause for concern. Three also
report their need for improvement of storage arrangements, presently not sufficiently intruder-proof .
Physical protection as provided by fire and intruder detection is another focus for concern.
For the
most part, the seven libraries which express dissatisfaction with the fire-fighting systems in effect are
anxious for their improvement rather than remedying any
lack of basic protection. Such a goal is recognized as
likely to be unattainable, however, since the modifications desired are expensive and often at variance with
established library practices.
The provision of access control in the form of intruder alarms is a related area which also elicited
various expressions of conce rn. Five repositories
(5.8%) saw the absence of such alarms as a security
problem, while three others (3.4%) reported a general
unea siness over the quality of their intruder protection. Other practices for regulating access to the
collection also generated comment·. Four respondents
noted their apprehension about after-hours and hence
unsupervised admission of maintenance and housekeeping
personnel; they represent, however, only a small minority of the thirty-four (39.5%) which permit such entry.
Two co-llections felt that their lock and key control
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was inadequate, while two others voiced a general concern over regulation of entry to the department .
Collection control as it is provided through
written records was the final area which was cited as a
continu ing security problem by those surveyed . Four
repositories (4 . 6%) regarded their finding aids as inadequate for identifying holdings; another found similar fault with the state of its inventory, labeling
this as the collection's most pressing security problem. Such concern for the quality of these tools mirrored the general findings of this study that fifty of
the eighty-six respondents (58.1%) believe such resources are of value in identifying only some, if any,
fugitive materials . Four institutions also identified
record keeping as related to reader services as a problem area. Two expressed a need to produce photocopies
to substitute for valuable items, a deficiency shared
by twenty-nine (33.7%) of the repositories . The need
to develop a registration and manuscripts use form was
noted by two respondents.
For the most part, however, physical control of
manuscript collections is well established among the
survey group, although weaknesses remain in the areas
of after-hours access regulations, keeping of vault use
records, and stamping of manuscripts.
It is with
preservation as it relates to patron use of materials
that these repositories sometimes fail to maintain adequate security . A narrow majority do interview pros pective readers and require photographic identification
of applicants, distribute a list of reading room rules
and regulations to patrons, limit the amount of material presented for use at one time, prohibit use of ink
while handling manuscripts, and require the completion
of char ge slips when requesting materials.
Yet only 37 percent of those surveyed impose any
restrictions on patrons' possessions in the search
room , and only some 33 percent examine these belongings
on depar ture . Some 45 percent extend to readers a
variety of scholar ' s privileges, and 59 percent permit

73

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 1980

13

Georgia Archive, Vol. 8 [1980], No. 2, Art. 7

access to unprocessed materials. Nearly 85 percent of
those which allow photocopying let the reader perform
this procedure, and only 48 percent maintain any written record of the practice . Some 39 percent of the
repositories participating in this study permit the use
of materials in other areas of the building, and nearly
one - fourth allow their removal from the premises.
Those surveyed are also grossly underprotected by insurance, with only eight (9.3%) holding "valued item"
policies that attempt to reflect current market values.
And only seven (8.1%) report any bonding of employees.
There are thus still many changes to be made before manuscript materials housed in academic libraries
can be said to be secure from both human malfeasance
and the elements . The concern for improvement voiced
both in the literature and in the self-analysis of
those participating in this study does interject a
brighter note into the often gloomy statistics. Five
libraries indicated that new buildings were being developed; in each instance, respondents reported that
the recognition of security needs contributed substantially to the planning of special collection facilities.
In the end, it must be remembered that those who
administer manuscript collections are striving not only
to protect the materials entrusted to their care but
also to extend the maximum public service possible
without jeopardizing such preservation efforts. And,
as noted archivist James 8. Rhoads has remarked, even
in the context of recommending procedures to thwart
theft, there is no foolproof combination of deterrents
in any situation .17 Certainly individual variations in
size and value of holdings, and in volume of use, make
differences in security procedures both understandable
and acceptable . What archivists and curators can and
should strive for is the minimal standard of patron
screening, surveillance, and record keeping that permits the administrator to control and preserve his
holdings .
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